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A POSTSCRIPT ON PRECEDENT IN THE
DIVIDED FIFTH CIRCUIT
by
Thomas E. Baker·
I.
OCTOBER I, 1981, marked a milestone in the history ofour federalcourts. 1 On that date, in moving closing ceremonies held in theGreat Hall of the Court of Appeals Building in New Orleans, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as created in 1891
ended.2 On that date, in equally memorable ceremonies the former Fifth
• B.S., Florida State University; J.D., University of Florida, Holland Law Center.
Assistant Professor of Law, Texas Tech University.
The author thanks Robin Welch, candidate for the Juris Doctor degree at Texas Tech
University School of Law, for his research assistance.
1. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1981, at A14, col. 1.
2. The Program of Fifth Circuit Closing Ceremonies included:
CLOSING CEREMONIES
HONORABLE JOHN G. GODBOLD
CHIEF JUDGE
PRESIDING
Professor Harvey Couch
G.F. Blalock, Director
Chief Warrant Officer, USN
Senior Chief Karl D. Fite, Conductor
Gilbert F. Ganucheau, Clerk
Processional of Judges
National Anthem
U.S. Navy Band New Orleans
Call to Order
Court Business
Adjournment of Court
Remarks and Recognition of
Distinguished Guests
History of the U.S. Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit
History of the Division of the Court
Remarks
Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Circuit
Justice
Remarks Honorable Warren E. Burger
The Chief Justice of the United States
Presentations Chief Judge John C. Godbold
Circuit Judge Charles Clark
Closing Remarks Chief Judge John C. Godbold
Commemorative Program for the Closing and Opening Ceremonies for the Division of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Oct. I, 1981, New Orleans, Louisiana).
Only a limited version of the former Fifth Circuit survives'until July I, 1984.
725
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Circuit was succeeded by two new courts, the new Fifth Circuit3 and the
new Eleventh Circuit.4 An Article in the September 1981 issue of this
3. The Program of Fifth Circuit Opening Ceremonies included:
OPENING CEREMONIES
HONORABLE CHARLES CLARK
CHIEF JUDGE
PRESIDING
Call to Order
Introduction and Oath to Office of
Circuit Executive
Introduction of
Attorneys' Advisory Committee
Bob F. Wright, Esquire
Leonard B. Melvin, Esquire
Finis Cowan, Esquire
Presentation of Local Rules
Admission of Attorneys
Remarks
Remarks
The New Fifth Circuit
Gilbert F. Ganucheau, Clerk
C. Raymond Judice
M. Truman Woodward, Esquire
T. Kenneth Watts, Esquire
Professor Thomas B. Black
Morris Harrell, Esquire
President-Elect American Bar
Edward F. Glusman, Esquire
President, Louisiana Bar
Leonard B. Melvin, Esquire
President, Mississippi Bar
Wayne Fisher, Esquire
President, Texas Bar
Betty H. Olchin, Esquire
President, Panama Canal Zone Bar
Honorable Rex E. Lee
Solicitor General of the United States
Circuit JustiCjl
Chief Judge Charles Clark
Adjournment
Benediction Rabbi Murray Blackman
Temple Sinai
Commemorative Program for the Closin~ and Opening Ceremonies for the Division of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Oct. I, 1981, New Orleans, Louisiana).
4. The Program of Eleventh Circuit Opening Ceremonies included:
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
PROGRAM SPEAKERS
National Anthem
Douglas N. Campbell, Esq., Attorney, Atlanta, Georgia
Opening Remarks-History ofCourt
Honorable Griffin B. Bell, former Attorney General of the United States;
former United States Circuit Judge, Fifth Circuit
Significance of Oath and the Judicial Robe
Honorable Elbert P. Tuttle, Senior Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals,
former Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
Presentation of Gavel
Broox G. Garrett, Esq., Vice President, Alabama State Bar Association
Admission of Attorneys
Broox G. Garrett, Esq., Vice President, Alabama State Bar Association
Samuel E. Smith, Esq., President, The Florida Bar
J. Douglas Stewart, Esq., President, State Bar of Georgia
Morris Harrell, Esq., President-Elect, American Bar Association
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Journal, entitled Precedent Times Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Ftfth
CircuitS (hereinafter referred to as Precedent Times Three), considered
"the novel issues of stare decisis raised by this division."6 That Article
prophesied that the precedents of the former Fifth Circuit decided before
the division would be binding on each multiple of the divided court; the
limited version of the former Fifth Circuit that survives the split, the new
Fifth Circuit, and the new Eleventh Circuit.' "But prophecy, however
honest, is generally a poor substitute for experience."8 Hence, the purpose
of this Postscript is to describe briefly the early experience of these three
courts regarding precedent. First, the September 1981 Article is summa-
rized in order to establish a context. A report of the three courts' treatment
of precedent follows. Finally, this Article ends with an evaluation of how
the two new courts are faring and a few general observations on circuit
splitting.
II.
Precedent Times Three told the history of the three-tiered federal court
system by tracing the evolution of the intermediate court.9 That account
CEREMONIES
Honorable Collins J. Seitz, Chief Judge, Third Circuit
Most senior Chief Judge of U.S. Court of Appeals
Honorable Charles Clark, Chief Judge, Fifth Circuit
Newest Chief Judge of U.S. Court of Appeals
From the Executive Branch-Honorable William French Smith,
Attorney General of the United States
From the Legislative Branch-Honorable Howell T. Heflin,
United States Senator from Alabama, Senior Member of Senate Judiciary
Committee from an Eleventh Circuit State
From the State Courts-Honorable Alan C. Sundberg,
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Florida
From the Supreme Court-Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States
From the ChiefJustice of the United States-
Honorable Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice
Benediction
Rev. Howard W. Creecy, Sr.
Atlanta, Georgia
Commemorative Program United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit Opening Cere-
monies (Oct. 2, 1982, Atlanta, Georgia).
5. Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J.
687 (1981).
6. Id. at 687. The literature concerning the division is quite extensive. See generally
sources cited id. at 696 nn.77 & 79; 697 n.84; 699 n.99; 701 n.nO; and 707 nn.I64-66; Ains-
worth, Fifth Circuit Court ofAppeals Reorganization Act of1980, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 523;
Heflin, Fffih Circuit Court ofAppeals Reorganization Act of 198~verdueRelieffor an
Overworked Court, 11 CUM. L. REv. 597 (1980-1981); Tate, The Last Year ofthe "Old" Fifth
(1891-1981),27 Loy. L. REv. 689 (1981).
7. Baker, supra note 5, at 706-07.
8. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 79, 82 (1935) (Cardozo, J.).
9. Baker, supra note 5, Part II, section A.
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demonstrated a persistent congressional preoccupation with the middle tier
of the federal court structure. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reor-
ganization Act of 198010 thus may be viewed as the latest manifestation of
this preoccupation. The specific events leading up to the division also are
detailed in Precedent Times Three. II The initial congressional response to
the former Fifth Circuit's surfeited docket was to add judges. 12 When this
attempted solution proved inadequate, the Commission on Revision of the
Federal Court System was appointed in 1972 to study the problem and to
make recommendations. 13 After a few false starts Congress enacted the
Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978.14 Besides adding still more judges, the
1978 Act provided that the Fifth Circuit judges could arrange themselves
into administrative units and sit en banc without all active judges partici-
pating. IS This congressional delegation led to the Fifth Circuit Judicial
Council arrangement of the Court into two administrative units, lettered
Unit A and Unit B, that corresponded geographically to the two new
courtS.16 By then the congressional solution of adding more judges had
become the problem. So many judges, sitting in so many multiples of
three, made intracircuit decisional conflicts inevitable. Furthermore, the
traditional unifying function of the en bane procedure had become un-
wieldy due to its size. I? The judges unanimously requested relief and Con-
10. Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (1980) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1,41) [here-
inafter cited as Reorganization Act].
II. Baker, supra note 5, Part II, section B. For a more recent account of the period
from a sitting judge's perspective, see generally Ainsworth, supra note 6. For an account of
the period from the senator who co-sponsored the legislation, see generally Heflin, supra
note 6.
12. Baker, supra note 5, at 696-97.
13. Id. at 697-99.
14. Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (codified at scattered sections of28 U.S.c. (Supp.
IY 1980»; see Baker, supra note 5, at 699·703.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. IV 1980); see Baker, supra note 5, at 702 n.118.
16. Baker, supra note 5, at 703.
17. Ainsworth, supra note 6, at 526-28; Tate, supra note 6, at 690-93. Originally, the en
banc function was undisturbed. On Jan. 14, 1981, after the division legislation was enacted,
the Judicial Council of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted the
following Interim Local Rule:
For panel decisions by Administrative Units of the Fifth Circuit bearing date
on and after Jan. 15, 1981:
Whenever a majority of the Judges of Administrative Unit A who are in regu-
lar active service orders an appeal which has been submitted to a panel of
Administrative Unit A to be reheard en banc, it shall be reheard by an en banc
court composed of all judges of Administrative Unit A who are in regular
active service.
Whenever a majority of the Judges of Administrative Unit B who are in regu-
lar active service orders an appeal which has been submitted to a panel of
Administrative Unit B to be reheard en banc, it shall be reheard by an en banc
court composed of all judges of Administrative Unit B who are in regular
active service.
Decisions not specifically designated as made by an Administrative Unit are
governed entirely by Fifth Circuit Local Rule 16. During the period that this
Interim Rule conftiets with any provision of Fifth Circuit Local Rule 16, this
Interim Local Rule shall control. All non-confticting provisions of Local Rule
16 remain in full force and effect.
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gress responded with the Reorganization Act. IS The Act divided the
former Fifth Circuit into two completely autonomous judicial circuits: the
new Fifth Circuit, composed of the District of the Canal Zone, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas; and the Eleventh Circuit, composed of Alabama,
Florida, and Georgia. 19
The Reorganization Act framed the central inquiry in Precedent Times
Three: What would be the precedential status of former Fifth Circuit deci-
sions, first, in the limited version of the Fifth Circuit that temporarily sur-
vives the division, second, in the new Fifth Circuit, and third, in the new
Eleventh Circuit? Based on public statements and the results of an infor-
mal questionnaire, the prior Article prophesied that all three courts would
view former Fifth Circuit case law as binding authority.2o The issue then
became how best to accomplish this task. After considering the three prin-
cipal mechanisms available, statute, stare decisis, and local court rule, the
logic of the situation selected the local court rule.21 Congress had ne-
glected to provide an express statutory solution.22 As alternative mecha-
nisms for installing the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit as binding
precedents in the two new courts, an informal judicial consensus, a panel
decision, and an en banc decision were each considered and discarded.23
A judicial consensus was deemed too informal and too readily circum-
vented. Neither the mechanism nor the underlying policy of stare decisis
would be any more than an announcement ofjudicial consensus. At either
the three-judge panel or the en banc level, the announcement that all fu-
ture panels of the two new courts would be bound by former Fifth Circuit
precedents would be dietum.24 Therefore, the only remaining mechanism
was suggested; a rule was proposed for adoption by the two new courts as
part of their en banc procedures.25 The proposed local rule would have
allowed a panel of the new courts to accept or reject former Fifth Circuit
precedent. As a limitation on this authority, however, a panel decision
overruling the former Fifth Circuit would be circulated to the entire court
and would be subject to initial en banc consideration in the new court.
The analysis in Precedent Times Three next turned to whether the prece-
dents of the former Fifth Circuit really should bind the two new courtS.26
The first considerations were the institutional tensions among panels and
between panels and the en banc court. The formal en banc procedure de-
veloped when it became possible to have multiple panels of three judges.
See a/so infra notes 42, 46 & 87. For a discussion of the origin of the power to reorganize
into internal divisions, see Baker, supra note 5, at 698-703.
18. See Baker, supra note 5, at 703-05.
19. Reorganization Act, supra note 10, §§ 1,41.
20. Baker, supra note 5, Part III, section A.
21. Id. Part III, section B.
22. Compare id. text accompanying notes 174-91 with id. text accompanying notes 297-
314.
23. Id. at 711-17.
24. Id. at 712-17.
25. Id. at 719.
26. Id. Part III, section C.
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En banc review preserves two essential and related institutional values;
one law of the circuit exists, and a majority of the judges establishes it.27
The rule of interpanel accord is a necessary corollary to the en banc func-
tion. This rule requires that a panel "treat earlier decisions of any panel as
binding precedent, absent intervening en banc or Supreme Court ac-
tion."28 Against this background Precedent Times Three considered
whether the division made it appropriate to apply these intracircuit devices
between the former Fifth Circuit and the two new courts.
According to the analysis in the prior Article, former Fifth Circuit deci-
sions would bind the version of that court that temporarily survives the
division based on nothing more than an obvious application of the rule of
interpanel accord.29 Because the new Fifth Circuit and the new Eleventh
Circuit stand in the same relation to the parent circuit, the significance of
the former Fifth Circuit precedents in each of the two new circuits should
be the same. Federal court history did not suggest a solution. The 1929
division of the Eighth Circuit and the creation of a new Tenth Circuit was
the only similar division. In that division neither Congress nor the two
courts explicitly dealt with the precedent problem.30 The analysis next
turned to the Reorganization Act itself. It was argued that the legislative
intent behind the 1980 Act was to create two new courts rather than to
continue the former Fifth Circuit in one or both new courts.3) Precedent
Times Three concluded, "Congress apparently intended the two new
courts of appeals to be autonomous and independent, one from another
and each from the former Fifth Circuit."32 Finally, the mechanism and
policy of stare decisis, as analyzed in the prior Article, did not compel the
wholesale transfer of former Fifth Circuit precedent into the two new
courts:
While there is no question that the law of the former Fifth Circuit
should be deemed uniquely persuasive for a time, no sufficiently
weighty policy justification exists for requiring panels of the new
courts to determine what the rule of former Fifth Circuit stare decisis
means with enough precision to follow it, but without the authority to
create law interstitially.33
This, in broad-brush summary, was the logic behind Precedent Times
Three. The Article prophesied that the judges on the two new courts
would consider themselves bound by former Fifth Circuit precedent, it
proposed a local rule to accomplish the goal, and then logically argued
against the whole approach to the problem. "So much for the fallacy of
27. Id. at 721 n.261.
28. Id. at 723; see also infra text accompanying note 69.
29. Baker, supra note 5, at 724-26. The continuation of the former Fifth Circuit raises
many complex issues of precedent, only some of which have been addressed by the two new
courts. See infra Part III.
30. Baker, supra note 5, at 726-28.
31. Id. at 728-30.
32. Id. at 731 (footnote omitted).
33. Id. at 734 (footnote omitted).
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logical form."34 By now, experience under the Reorganization Act may be
substituted for the prophecy. This Postscript turns to that experience.
III.
Briefly stated, early experience35 under the Reorganization Act demon-
strates that predivision decisions of the former Fifth Circuit are binding
precedents in all three courts. Detailed here, however, are some significant
qualifications to this general rule.
A.
As part of the statutorily imposed transition procedures, the former
Fifth Circuit continues to exist for matters that were submitted for decision
before October 1, 1981.36 As part of their individual internal operating
procedures, both new courts have established the initial oral argument
date as the date of submission in oral argument appeals, and the date on
which the third screening panel judge concurs in summary or nonargu-
ment calendar disposition as the submission date for all other appeals.37
Beginning with Bright v. United States,38 the last predivision en banc deci-
sion of the former Fifth Circuit, appeals decided by this temporary version
of the former Fifth Circuit are labeled in Federal Reporter, Second Series
with an asterisk and the notation "Former Fifth Circuit case, Section 9(1)
of Public Law 96-452-0ctober 14, 1980."39 To date,40 approximately
two-thirds of the estimated total of three hundred pending asterisk ap-
peals41 have been decided.42 These asterisk decisions include appeals de-
cided by panels of Unit A43 and Unit B44 and panels composed before the
34. The fallacy to which I refer is the notion that the only force at work in the
development of the law is logic. . . .
And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for
repose which is in every human mind. . . .
So much for the fallacy of logical form.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 465, 468 (1897).
35. The cut-off date for this Article was Feb. 25,1982. All decisions of the three courts
were considered through volume 666 of Federal Reporter, Second Series.
36. Reorganization Act, supra note 10, § 9(1).
37. UNITED STATES COURT OF ApPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, INTERNAL OP-
ERATING PROCEDURES VI.A, at 18 (Oct. 1, 1981); UNITED STATES COURT OF ApPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES 8, at 21 (Oct. I, 1981).
38. 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The former court announced this decision as
part of the Closing Ceremonies. See supra note 2.
39. 658 F.2d at 999 n.*.
40. See supra note 35.
41. Harvey, The lJivision ofAn Historic Circuit, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 2, 1981, at 1,29, col. 3.
42. As of Feb. I, 1982, the various units had the following number of appeals awaiting
decision after argument or submission: Preunitization panel Fifth Circuit: 4; Preunitization
en banc Fifth Circuit: 7; Unit A panel: 20; Unit A en banc: 2; Unit B panel: 58; Unit B en
banc: 2. FIFTH CIRCUIT REPORT OF DECISIONS AFTER ARGUMENT OR SUBMISSION (Feb. I,
1982).
43. E.g., Dawson v. Childs, 665 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1982); Alford v. City of Lubbock, 664
F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1982); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981); Washington
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internal reorganization into units,45 as well as en bane decisions of the
former Fifth Circuit.46 It comes as no surprise that among these asterisk
cases, the rule of interpanel accord has been applied by Unit A panels47
and by Unit B panels48 to precedents of the former Fifth Circuit decided
before the effective date of the Reorganization ACt.49 Because these ap-
peals were decided by the former Fifth Circuit, the application of former
Fifth Circuit precedent is of little moment. Somewhat more surprising,
however, are asterisk decisions that rely on previously decided decisions of
the new Fifth Circuit50 or the new Eleventh Circuit.51 The significance
afforded former Fifth Circuit precedent in the two new courts is of greater
interest.52
v. Watkins, 662 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lacey, 661 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.
1981); Barnstone v. University of Houston, 660 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1981); City of Seabrook v.
E.P.A., 659 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981); Lyles v. Estelle, 658 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Platenburg, 657 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1981).
44. E.g., Staton v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Nicoll,
664 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1982); Alderman v. Austin, 663 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436 (5th
Cir. 1981); Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Ouder, 659
F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1981); Miller v. Turner, 658 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1981); Helms v. McDan-
iel, 657 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1981).
45. E.g., United States v. Flynn, 664 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 663 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981); Kite v. Marshall, 661 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1981);
Helms v. Jones, 660 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981) (on remand); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v.
FERC, 659 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1981); Bradley v. HUD, 658 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1981); United
Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 657 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1981).
46. Most ofthe asterisk en bane decisions were decided by the entire former court. E.g.,
Broussard v. South Pac. Transp. Co., 665 F.2d 1387 (5th Cir. 1982) (en bane); Brown v.
Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607 (5th cir. 1982) (en bane); United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d
435 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane); Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 662 F.2d 1110
(5th Cir. 1981) (en bane); Guice v. Fortenberry, 661 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane); Aretz
v. United States, 660 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane); Estate of Bright v. United States,
658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane). A few were decided by unit en bane courts. E.g.,
Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 664 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A en bane); Washington v.
Watkins, 662 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A en bane); Williams v. Blackburn, 661 F.2d
1020 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A en bane); United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Unit A en bane). See also supra note 17.
47. E.g., United States v. Colacurcio, 659 F.2d 684, 687 (5th Cir. 1981); Howard v.
Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352, 359 (5th Cir. 1981).
48. E.g., United States v. Adamson, 665 F.2d 649, 656 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 626 (5th Cir. 1982); Wilson v. Taylor, 658 F.2d 1021, 1034-35 (5th Cir.
1981).
49. Of course, the rule never had application to the en bane court. Baker, supra note 5,
at 723-24.
50. E.g., Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 534 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982); Alford v.
City of Lubbock, 664 F.2d 1263, 1266 (5th Cir. 1982); Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham
Corp., 665 F.2d 515, 519 (5th Cir. 1981). For the former Fifth Circuit to consider itself
bound by new Fifth Circuit decisions makes little sense. See Baker, supra note 5, at 725-26.
Perhaps, this can be explained by the new court's self-image as a mere continuation of the
old court. See generally infra Part III, section B.
51. E.g., United States v. Davis, 666 F.2d 195,201 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Dean, 666 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 1982). For the former Fifth Circuit to consider itself
bound by new Eleventh Circuit decisions makes even less sense than deferring to new Fifth
Circuit decisions. See Baker, supra note 5, at 723-24.
52. The various categories of precedents raise a citation problem. Careful lawyers and
judges must heed the judicial distinctions based on dates. In one asterisk court opinion,
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit were cited from before and after Oct. 1, 1982. Cases
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While the new Eleventh Circuit had addressed the problem of precedent
directly,53 the position of the new Fifth Circuit must be gleaned from the
court's "careful ambiguities and silences."54 The new Fifth Circuit seems
to view itself as a continuation of the former Fifth Circuit.55 Neither the
new Fifth Circuit's local rules56 nor its internal operating procedures57 ad-
dress the precedent issue. No new Fifth Circuit en bane court has consid-
ered the question. New Fifth Circuit panel opinions have not discussed
the issue directly. Several panel decisions in the new court, however, have
.expressly invoked the rule of interpanel accord and relied on former Fifth
Circuit decisions.58 In one new court decision the panel went so far as to
apply the rule of interpanel accord to rely on an asterisk decision, a former
Fifth Circuit decision decided after the effective date of the Reorganization
ACt.59 Additionally, in referring to decisions of the former Fifth Circuit,
several panels of the new Fifth Circuit have used language suggesting that
the new court is actually a continuation of the old court.60
Thus the new Fifth Circuit seems to have followed the approach taken
by the Eighth Circuit when it was divided to create the Tenth Circuit. The
new Fifth Circuit has gone about its business following its prior prece-
before that date were cited "(5th Cir. [year]):" Cases after that date were cited "(Former 5th
Cir. [year])." United States v. McRary, 665 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1982). This system, however,
does not distinguish new Fifth Circuit cases. Perhaps this is appropriate if the new Fifth
Circuit is a continuation of the old. See infra Part III, section B. One solution is to include
the month and day of decision in the parenthetical, assuming that the reader will have a
working knowledge of the pertinent principles of precedents.
53. See infra Part III, section C.
54. "[T]he careful ambiguities and silences of the majority opinion call for a full exposi-
tion of the [issue] ...." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 279 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
55. This impression is shared by at least two other commentators. See Keeffe, Browser
al Large, 68 A.B.A. J. 220, 220 (1982); Tate, supra note 6, at 691-92; if Ainsworth, supra
note 6, at 526-31.
56. See generally RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF ApPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT-SUPPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL RULES OF ApPELLATE PROCEDURE (Oct. 1, 1981).
57. See generally UNITED STATES COURT OF ApPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT INTER-
NAL OPERATING PROCEDURES (Oct. 1, 1981).
58. E.g., United States v. Brummitt, 665 F.2d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 1981); Raqueno v. Im-
migration & Naturalization Serv., 663 F.2d 555, 556 (5th Cir. 1981); Placid Inv. Ltd. v.
Girard Trust Bank, 662 F.2d 1176, 1178 (5th Cir. 1981); Ellis v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 419 (5th
Cir. 1981); Ryals v. Estelle, 661 F.2d 904, 906 (5th Cir. 1981); Vasquez v. McAllen Bag &
Supply Co., 660 F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir. 1981).
59. Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen. Hosp., 665 F.2d 724, 729 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Wilson
v. Taylor, 658 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1981»; see also Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 666 F.2d
255, 256 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. McCarty, 665 F.2d 596, 597 (5th Cir. 1982); Flow-
ers Transp., Inc. v. MjV Peanut Hollinger, 664 F.2d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 1981).
60. E.g., United States v. Townley, 665 F.2d 579, 582 (5th Cir. 1982) ("an earlier deci-
sion of this circuit has noted"); Deyo v. City of Deer Park, 664 F.2d 518, 522 (5th Cir. 1981)
("Similarly, in Beverly v. Lone Slar Lead Conslr. Corp., ... this court held"); Reimer v.
Smith, 663 F.2d 1316, 1323 (5th Cir. 1981) ("In Wagner v. Bonner, . .. we stated"); Salinas
v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Salinas relies on our decision in"); Meyer
v. Brown & Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 371 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981) ("This Court has
stated").
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dent.61 All previously decided former Fifth Circuit decisions, whether de-
cided before or after the effective date of the Reorganization Act, are being
considered as binding precedents in the new court.62 The remarks of Chief
Judge Clark at the new court's opening ceremonies suggest that this course
has been by design and not by happenstance:
We recognize that the words Congress used to divide the Fifth Cir-
cuit are read by some as decreeing that we died today and that two
new circuits were born. Such a construction shall not guide this court.
The spirit of this legislation sought to strengthen the historic impact of
this court, not to terminate it. The letter killeth but the spirit giveth
life. Weare determined to be of that strengthening spirit.
Long live the Fifth Circuit!63
The new Fifth Circuit apparently has reached a judicial consensus that
its panels will routinely apply the appropriate precedent of the former
Fifth Circuit, subject to an en banc overruling. The new circuit has an-
nounced this consensus through its chief spokesperson and panels have
thus far adhered to it.64
c.
The new Eleventh Circuit has directly considered the issue of what prec-
edential import it should afford decisions of the former Fifth Circuit.
Chief Judge Godbold65 wrote for a unanimous en banc court in Bonner v.
City ofPrichard,66 the first case to be heard and the first opinion to be
published by the new United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.67 The en banc court held:
61. Baker, supra note 5, at 726-28.
62. No decision has arisen in which the new Fifth Circuit has held itself bound by a
decision of the new Eleventh Circuit. The rule of interpanel accord, of course, does not
apply between circuits. Id. at 723-24, 732-33. But see supra notes 50-5 I.
63. Remarks of Chief Judge Charles Clark at the Opening Ceremonies for the Division
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Oct. 1, 1981, New Orleans,
Louisiana); see supra note 3. Chief Judge Clark has described his address as "[t]he only
public position on the subject ofprecedent." Letter from Chief Judge Charles Clark, United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Feb. 9, 1982). After quoting the language
quoted in the text, Chief Judge Clark explained, "I know of no formal holding to this effect
nor of any contemplation that one will be forthcoming. The name continues with all it
implies." Id. In earlier correspondence, Chief Judge Clark stated that his remarks "commit
our circuit to the course we are determined to follow." Letter from Chief Judge Charles
Clark, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Oct. 7, 1981).
64. For a discussion ofthe judicial consensus approach, see Baker, supra note 5, at 711-
12. Arguably, the panel decisions relying on the former Fifth Circuit precedent cited supra
notes 61-63 are themselves precedents for this approach to the former court's case law. But
see Baker, supra note 5, at 712-16.
65. Not only is ChiefJudge Godbold "the first individual in the nation's history to hold
that position in two different circuits," Baker, supra note 5, at 707-08 n.168, but until July I,
1984, when the former Fifth Circuit ceases to exist, he simultaneously serves as Chief Judge
of both the new Eleventh Circuit and the former Fifth Circuit. Commemorative Program
for the Closing and Opening Ceremonies for the Division of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Oct. 1, 1981, New Orleans, Louisiana).
66. 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981).
67. An appeal in an actual "case or controversy" was the necessary vehicle for deciding
the issue. See Baker, supra note 5, at 713 n.203. To arrange for Bonner v. City ofPrichard to
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[TJhe decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit (the "former Fifth" or the "old Fifth"), as that court existed on
September 30, 1981, handed down by that court prior to the close of
business on that date, shall be binding as precedent in the Eleventh
Circuit, for this court, the district courts, and the bankruptcy courts in
the circuit.68
be heard en banc was no simple task. The Reorganization Act provided for the processing
of cases that prior to Oct. 1, 1981, had been filed in the former Fifth Circuit:
(I) If the matter has been submitted for decision, further proceedings in re-
spect of the matter shall be had in the same manner and with the same effect
as if this Act had not been enacted.
(2) If the matter has not been submitted for decision, the appeal or proceed-
ings, together with the original papers, printed records, and record entries duly
certified, shall, by appropriate orders, be transferred to the court to which it
would have gone had this Act been in full force and effect at the time such
appeal was taken or other proceeding commenced, and further proceedings in
respect of the case shall be had in the same manner and with the same effect as
if the appeal or other proceeding had been filed in such court.
Reorganization Act, supra note 10, §§ 9(1), (2). For a summary of the statutory transition
procedures, see Baker, supra note 5, at 705-06. In Bonner v. City ofPrichard the en banc
court held that a case filed prior to Oct. 1, 1981, in the former Fifth Circuit was "submitted
for decision" to the former court within the meaning of the Reorganization Act on the date
the appeal was heard by an oral argument panel of the former court or was fully decided by
a three-judge screening panel of the former court without oral argument. 661 F.2d at 1208.
Precedent Times Three had suggested that in the latter nonargument type of appeal the
sending of the briefs and records to the initiating judge on the screening panel should be the
submission point. Baker, supra note 5, at 706 n.152. The practical difference between the
suggested submission point and the en banc court's submission point is that the latter results
in fewer appeals being decided by the former court since their transfer from a panel in a unit
of the former court to a corresponding panel in the appropriate new court will occur up until
the point at which the last screening judge concurs in the nonargument disposition. See
generally Rahdert & Roth, Inside the F!fth Circuit: Looking at Some ofInternal Procedures,
23 Loy. L. REV. 661 (1977).
As part of its internal operating procedures, the Eleventh Circuit has codified this part of
the Bonner v. City ofPrichard holding. UNITED STATES COURT OF ApPEALS FOR THE ELEV-
ENTH CIRCUIT, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES VI.A, at 18 (Oct. 1, 1981). Accord,
UNITED STATES COURT OF ApPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, INTERNAL OPERATING PRO-
CEDURES 8, 21 (Oct. I, 1981).
The question remained how Bonner v. City ofPrichard satisfied this definition of submis-
sion so that the new court could consider the appeal. The en banc court reasoned that an
appeal designated for oral argument before Oct. I, 1981, that was scheduled for oral argu-
ment after that date had not been "submitted" to the former court. Bonner v. City ofPrich-
ard was such an appeal. During routine screening in Sept. 1981 an initiating judge of a
former Fifth Circuit Unit B screening panel assigned the case for oral argument. Since a
nonargument disposition had not begun, such a disposition could not be completed, and
since there were no oral argument panels sitting before Oct. I, 1981, to which it could be
argued, the appeal was in neither way "submitted for decision." Not having been submitted
to the former court, the appeal became an Eleventh Circuit case under § 9(2) of the Reor-
ganization Act, quoted above. 661 F.2d at 1208. The new Eleventh Circuit, by an informal
consensus prior to Oct. I, 1981, which was confirmed by a formal vote on Oct. 2, 1981,
agreed to consider the case en banc to rule on the precedent issue. Id. 1207.
68. 661 F.2d at 1207. Just as Chief Judge Clark's speech forewarned the new Fifth
Circuit's approach to precedent, see supra text accompanying note 63, the statement of
Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. before the Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee
forewarned the new Eleventh Circuit's approach: "We represent without reservation that as
now constituted the Court can be divided into two three-state circuits without any significant
philosophical consequences within either of the proposed circuits." Ainsworth, supra note 6,
at 528 (quoting Federal Court Organization and F!fth Circuit Division: Hearings on H.R.
6060, H.R. 766.5 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
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The en bane court generally followed the analysis, if not all the recom-
mendations, in Precedent Times Three. Initially, the en bane court com-
mitted the new Eleventh Circuit to the absolute rule of interpanel accord
that had been followed in the former Fifth Circuit; "a prior decision of the
circuit (panel or en bane) could not be overruled by a panel but only by
the court sitting en banc."69 Having made this institutional commitment,
the en bane court next considered the critical issues of whether it should
adopt some established body of law as its own precedents and, if so, what
established body of case law it should choose. Several reasons were of-
fered for the en bane court's decision to adopt former Fifth Circuit
precedents.
The en bane court first emphasized the importance of stability and pre-
dictability in the rule of law.70 The three states in the new Eleventh Cir-
cuit had been a part of the former Fifth Circuit since 1866.71 During this
time district courts and bankruptcy courts have provided the appeals, the
present Eleventh Circuit judges have made recent contributions, lawyers
have litigated countless cases, and the public has ordered its affairs in reli-
ance on the body of law developed by the former Fifth Circuit.72 By
adopting the former Fifth Circuit precedents, a measure of these values
would be preserved.73 The en bane court also relied on the historical pre-
cedent when Congress divided the Eighth Circuit in 1929.74 Finally and
most importantly, while theoretically possible, the failure to select a body
of precedent would be practical hopple. Litigants, their attorneys, panels,
and the en bane court would be forced to examine every issue in every
appeal as an issue of first impression. Such a state of affairs was deemed
unnecessary and undesirable.75 Refusing to embark on their judicial mis-
Administration ofJustice ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1980)
(statement of the Honorable Frank M. Johnson». Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. echoed
this sentiment: "Our jud~ment should be trusted that the judicial {'hilosophy of the two
courts after the division will not differ from what it is today ...." Amswortb, supra note 6,
at 529.
69. 661 F.2d at 1209; see Baker, supra note 5, at 723-24; see also Tate, supra note 6, at
690.
70. 661 F.2d at 1209-10 (quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375,
403 (1970».
71. See Baker, supra note 5, app. at 736-39.
72. 661 F.2d at 1210. These reasons parallel the general policy arguments of stare deci-
sis that Judge Frank identified and criticized: justice, stability, symmetry, attorney reliance,
and institutional convenience. See Baker, supra note 5, at 731-32.
73. The en banc court, of course, would be able to overrule any former Fifth Circuit
precedent. 661 F.2d at 1210. Arguably, this power renders the Bonner v. City ofPrichard
disposition a Catch-22 type of dictum. See Baker, supra note 5, at 716-17.
74. 661 F.2d at 1210 (citing Thompson v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 5 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Okla.
1934), and In re Meyers, 1 F. Supp. 673 (W.O. Okla. 1932), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Burbee v. Spurrier Lumber Co., 64 F.2d 5 (10th Cir. 1933». But see Baker, supra note 5, at
726-28, concluding that "[t]he creation of the Tenth Circuit precedent ... is mconclusive."
Id. at 728.
75. 661 F.2d at 121 I. "The prospect of decades of writing on a clean slate in pursuit of
the possibility that in some case or cases we might find a rule we like better (or even con-
clude that an old Fifth Circuit decision is wrong) is at best unappealing, at worst cata-
strophic." Id. The rejected approach would have transformed every panel opinion into a
potential en banc appeal, as a new precedent "of exceptional importance." Id. But if
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sion without a body of precedent, the judges concluded, "We choose in-
stead to begin on a stable, fixed, and identifiable base while maintaining
the capacity for change."76
The en bane court's analysis then considered how to proceed in adopting
the former Fifth Circuit precedent. It was unwilling to adopt precedent by
an informal and unrevealed consensus among the individual judges be-
cause of the lack of notice and the inherent instability in such an ap-
proach.77 The rule-making power was deemed an inappropriate method
for adopting a body of precedent because the task was substantive and
judicial, not procedural and administrative.78 Having implicitly rejected
the panel mechanism by its grant of en bane review in Bonner v. City of
Prichard, the only remaining mechanism for the wholesale adoption of
former Fifth Circuit precedent was the en bane decision in the case sub
judice.79
The en bane court, however, did not incorporate all former Fifth Circuit
precedent without qualification.so Instead, the court adopted only deci-
sions of the former Fifth Circuit decided on or before September 30, 1981,
the day before the effective date of the Reorganization Act.SI The effect on
Eleventh Circuit law of other categories of former Fifth Circuit case law
was reserved for "future consideration."82 Thus left in litigatory limbo
were decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down after September
Baker, supra note 5, at 731 n.321 (suggesting that the application of the rule of interpanel
accord between two circuits might violate the spirit of FED. R. ApP. P. 35). The en banc
court also made an analogy to the nearly wholesale adoption in this country of English
common law. 661 F.2d at 1211; see Baker, supra note 5, at 710-11.
76. 661 F.2d at 1211. For a discussion of the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta
movere, relied upon so heavily by the en banc court, see Baker, supra note 5, at 712-17.
77. 661 F.2d at 1210 (citing Baker, supra note 5, at 711). The rejected judicial consensus
tactic seems to be close to the approach taken by the new Fifth Circuit. See supra Part III,
section B.
78. 661 F.2d at 1210-11 (citing Baker, supra note 5, at 717). But see Baker, supra note 5,
at 718-20 (proposing an administrative solution as part of the local rules for en banc proce-
dures). Consistent with Bonner v. City ofPrichard, neither the local rules nor the internal
operating procedures of the new Eleventh Circuit deal with the precedent problem. See
generally INTERIM LOCAL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF ApPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT (Oct. I, 1981) (The interim rules will be tested for one year and then
reviewed and revised. Id. at I); UNITED STATES COURT OF ApPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES (Oct. I, 1981).
79. For a discussion of the intransigent problems of stare decisis involved in the panel
and en banc mechanisms, see Baker, supra note 5, at 713-18. The en banc court also implic-
itly rejected the statutory mechanism and the argument made in Precedent Times Three that
the lej;islative intent behind the Reorganization Act discouraged adoption of former Fifth
CirCUit precedent. See id. at 728-30; see also Heflin, supra note 6, at 614.
80. 661 F.2d at 1209.
81. The last ten decisions of the former Fifth Circuit adopted in Bonner v. City ofPrich-
ard were decided on Sept. 30, 1981. United States v. Lerma, 657 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1981);
Louisiana Chem. Ass'n v. Bingham, 657 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1981); Vicon, Inc. v. CMI Corp.,
657 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Wilson, 657 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1981); Johnson
v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 657 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1981); Hollis v. Itawamba County Loans, 657
F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1981); McKinney v. Estelle, 657 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Mouton, 657 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1981);
NLRB v. Decibel Prods., Inc., 657 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1981).
82. 661 F.2d at 1209 n.5.
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30, 1981, in appeals submitted to that court before October 1, 1981. All
post-September 30th panel decisions of Unit A and Unit B and en banc
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit are in this category, and they carry
the asterisk described above.83 The en banc court in Bonner v. City of
Prichard thus avoided a dictum concerning the effect of these limbo deci-
sions not relevant to the merits.84 Considered in perspective, these limbo
decisions may be of limited consequence among the vast number of prece-
dents that Bonner v. City ofPrichard did incorporate into Eleventh Circuit
law.8s The Reorganization Act, however, mandates that the former Fifth
Circuit continue to exist to decide appeals submitted before the effective
date as "the fifth judicial circuit of the United States as in existence on the
day before the effective date."86 The statute makes no distinction between
appeals decided on or before September 30, 1981, and those appeals de-
cided after that date. In order to draw such a distinction in a future deci-
sion, the new Eleventh Circuit will have to explain any disparate treatment
of the case precedents in terms of the policies already discussed that mili-
tated in favor of incorporating some former Fifth Circuit case law.87
In any event, the en banc decision in Bonner v. City ofPrichard has been
followed in the Eleventh Circuit. Panels of the new Eleventh Circuit have
expressly applied the rule of interpanel accord to appropriate decisions of
83. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
84. Mitchum v. Purvis, 650 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1981), decided on July 13, 1981, con-
trolled the merits that involved the due process rights of a prisoner in an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980). Perhaps the decision to adopt former Fifth Circuit precedent
was made easier by the agreement of both parties in Bonner v. City ofPrichard. Appellant
and appellees joined in urging that the court adopt former Fifth Circuit precedent; the latter,
however, urged that the en banc overrule Mitchum. 661 F.2d at 1212. While the en banc
court could have overruled Mitchum, it chose not to do so. Id. at 1211-12.
85. The burgeoning docket that led to the division of the former Fifth Circuit also re-
sulted in an enormous output. By 1981 total filings in the former court approached 5,000; of
nearly 2,500 opinions, nearly 1,600 were published. Tate, supra note 6, at 693-95. Given
this remarkable recent outeut and the 90-year life of the former Fifth Circuit, the limbo
decisions are almost negligible.
86. Reorganization Act, supra note 10, § 10(1); see Baker, supra note 5, at 705-06.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 70-79. The new Eleventh Circuit was reluctant
to adopt as precedent those decisions of the former Fifth Circuit decided by Unit B of the
old court after Sept. 30, 1981. This reluctance seems strange because Unit B was composed
of the same states and the same judges as the Eleventh Circuit. Another consideration may
reveal why the Eleventh Circuit was so careful in its holding. The more recent former Fifth
Circuit cases also include appeals decided by Unit A of the old court, which was composed
of the same states and the same judges as the new Fifth Circuit. To adopt Unit B's post-
September 30th case law is reasonable, but to adopt that of Unit A without the ability to
participate in any Unit A en banc review is less justifiable. See supra note 7. Judge Tate
explained the problem created by unit en banc courts:
Thus, if a majority of Unit A judges disagreed with a Unit B precedent, they
were bound by it until in its own case, a Unit A en banc decision overruled
it-following which, Unit B would be bound by this Unit A en banc opinion,
until a Unit B opinion overruled. Despite theoretical difficulties that may be
envisioned, the expectation was realized that, in fact, little practical problem
would be created during the short transitional period between January and
October, 1981.
Tate, supra note 6, at 692. The en banc court in Bonner v. City of Prichard held that a
decision of either unit of the former Fifth Circuit would be binding so long as it was decided
on or before Sept. 30, 1981. 661 F.2d at 1211 n.8.
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the former Fifth Circuit.88 Several opinions have expressly relied on Bon-
ner Y. City ofPrichard for the general proposition that the appropriate for-
mer Fifth Circuit case law is binding on the panels of the new Eleventh
Circuit.89 In addition, some opinions in the Eleventh Circuit refer to se-
lected former Fifth Circuit decisions in language suggesting that the two
courts are one,90 just as has been done in some new Fifth Circuit opin-
ions.91 Finally, the rule of interpanel accord already has developed in the
new Eleventh Circuit with panels of the new court considering themselves
bound by their own nascent precedents.92
IV.
The problem of precedent, so carefully analyzed in Precedent Times
Three, is not the most critical issue raised by the division of the former
Fifth Circuit. Clearly, "[i]n the future, Congress should legislate with re-
spect to the viability of precedents across redrawn boundary lines."93 The
tack of the new Fifth Circuit and the decision of the new Eleventh Circuit
in Bonner Y. City ofPrichard have solved the problem of precedent in large
part. Indeed, recognizing the increasing finality of the courts of appeals in
our federal judicial system,94 the problem of precedent would be settled
"in the course of a generation"9S without any definitive ruling. Judges,
88. E.g., United States v. Bums, 662 F.2d 1378, 1383-84 (lIth Cir. 1981); United States
v. One (1) Doustas A-26B Aircraft, 662 F.2d 1372, 1377-78 (lIth Cir. 1981).
89. E.g., Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 329 n.4 (11th Cir. 1982); Ultracashmere
House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1182 n.ll (lIth Cir. 1981); United States v. Miller, 664
F.2d 826, 827 n.2 (11th Cir. 1981); United States v. Scott, 664 F.2d 264, 264 n.l (llth Cir.
1981); Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 664 F.2d 260, 262 n.5 (lIth Cir. 1981); Goodman v. Keo-
hane, 663 F.2d 1044, 1046 n.l (11th Cir. 1981).
90. The panel in McLaughlin v. City of La Grange, 662 F.2d 1385 (11th Cir. 1981)
explained:
On October 2, 1981, this court sitting en banc adopted all existing precedent
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on September 30,
1981, as its own. Reference to ''this Court," "we," ''us'' and cases decided by
the "old Fifth Circuit" are based on that ruling.
Id. at 1388 n.2; see also, e.g., Strode Publishers, Inc. v. Holtz, 665 F.2d 333, 335 (lIth Cir.
1982) (''The general rule has been stated by us several times."); United States v. Cox, 664
F.2d 257, 260 (11th Cir. 1981) ("We have reversed convictions because of similar remarks.");
Erkins v. Bryan, 663 F.2d 1048, 1051 (lIth Cir. 1981) (''This Court has held"); Cowart v.
Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 734 (11th Cir. 1981) ("In several recent cases, this circuit has
concluded").
91. See supra text accompanying note 60.
92. E.g., United States v. Rivamonte, 666 F.2d 515, 517 (11th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Schwartz, 666 F.2d 461, 463 (lIth Cir. 1982).
93. Baker, supra note 5, at 734.
94. The Fifth Circuit last year heard 18.8% of all cases appealed to the eleventh
federal circuit courts of appeal. For a substantial percentage of federal liti-
gants, it was thus in effect a court of last resort, since during the past year the
United States Supreme Court granted only twenty-four petitions for certiorari
to review its 2,743 opinions, less than 1% of the opinions entered.
Tate, supra note 6, at 694; see also Baker, Constitutional Law, 27 Loy. L. REv. 80S, 862
(1981) (Fifth Circuit Symposium).
95. The reports of a given jurisdiction in the course of a generation take up
pretty much the whole body of the law, and restate it from the present point of
view. We could reconstruct the corpus from them if all that went before were
burned. The use of the earlier reports is mainly historical. . . .
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attorneys, or commentators have not yet had time to discern the degree
and quality of differences in law between the two new courts.96 The initial
institutional reactions to the division, perhaps, have postponed th~ inevita-
ble. Presumably, future differences between the new Fifth and new Elev-
enth Circuits will eventually be just as pronounced as the present
differences between the Eighth and Tenth Circuits.97 The more critical
issue to the future of our federal courts is whether circuit splitting is the
appropriate congressional response to the problems facing the large courts
of appeals. This issue was largely ignored in Precedent Times Three and
may only be introduced here.
Congressional anticipations of the effects of the Reorganization Act in-
cluded a decreased likelihood of intracircuit conflicts, a more manageable
output of opinions, a simplification of en bane procedures, and a savings of
time and expenses due to reduced travel by litigants and court personnel.98
The primary purpose, however, was "to provide consistent, expeditious
justice for the citizens of the circuits."99 While an evaluation of how the
two new courts are faring is somewhat premature, several knowledgeable
commentators have formed some first impressions. loo The former Fifth
Circuit's docket matched the mammoth proportions of its geographical
size. 101 The docket was so large that each of the new court's dockets after
the division is still large when compared to the other circuits. If the former
Fifth Circuit's filings for the twelve-month period ending September 30,
1980, were allocated to the two new circuits, the new Fifth Circuit would
be second only to the Ninth Circuit in filings, and the Eleventh Circuit
would rank sixth among the twelve circuits. 102 Despite its crushing docket,
the former Fifth Circuit became "current" just before the effective date of
the Reorganization Act, largely due to the increased judgepower from the
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897).
96. See Harvey, supra note 41, at 29.
97. See Baker, supra note 5, at 726-28.
98. Heflin, supra note 6, at 616-17.
99. Id. at 617; see also Baker, supra note 5, at 728-30.
The goal of the legislation is to meet societal change and growing caseloads
in the six States presently comprising the Fifth Circuit. It accomplishes this by
providing the residents, attorneys, and litigants who reside or litigate within
those States with a new Federal judicial structure which is capable of meeting
the clear mandates of our judicial system-the rendering of consistent, expedi-
tious, fair and inexpensive justice. The two new circuits will preserve and
promote the vigor, integrity and independence of the illustrious parent court.
H.R. REP. No. 1390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. I, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 4236, 4237.
100. See generally Ainsworth, supra note 6; Heflin, supra note 6; Rubin, F!fth Circuit
Symposium Introduction, 25 Loy. L. REV. 441 (1979); Tate, supra note 5; Wisdom, Requiem
lor a Great Court, 26 Loy. L. REV. 787 (1980).
101. Between 1970 (2,014) and 1980 (4,225) filings more than doubled and it was esti-
mated that by 1982 in excess of 5,000 cases would be filed. Heflin, supra note 6, at 597. The
workloads of all the circuit courts increased nearly 100% in the decade of the I970s. Id. at
598 n.6. "[Sltatistical summaries abound." Baker, supra note 5, at 697 n.83 (citations of
summaries and reports).
102. Ainsworth, supra note 6, at 523 n.2.
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Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978. 103 Compared with the prior year's
filings, in 1981 the states in the new Fifth Circuit experienced an eight
percent increase and the states in the new Eleventh Circuit experienced a
twenty-four percent increase. 104 Just how long the two new courts can re-
main current is unclear. In any event, each of the two new courts is a large
court and is likely to experience such eventual docket growth that its effec-
tive functioning will be endangered. !Os Inevitably, Congress will consider
further divisions in the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and in other cir-
cuits. The critical issue then will be circuit splitting itself rather than the
problems of precedent.
The debate has already been joined. A congressional proponent of cir-
cuit splitting has opined, "Congress recognized that a point is reached
where the addition of judges decreases the effectiveness of the court, com-
plicates the administration of uniform law, and potentially diminishes the
quality of justice within a circuit."I06 Chief Justice Burger has called for
legislation to divide the Ninth Circuit into three "full-fledged" circuits, 107
a solution that he has suggested is inevitable in the new Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits. !Os Opponents of circuit splitting object that adding judges and
dividing courts will not only fail to solve the problem but "it irreversibly
dilutes the federalizing function of courts of appeals."109 Senior Judge
103. Tate, supra note 6, at 693.
104. Id. at 693 n.6. The discrepancy between filing increases in the two new courts is
explained by the fact that the early appointment of the new Fifth Circuit district judges
affected the filings in 1980 while the new Eleventh Circuit district judges were appointed
later, postponing the effect of the appeals they generated until 1981. Id. Current predictions
suggest a normal growth rate of 6% in filings in each court. Id. at 693-94.
105. Wisdom, supra note 100, at 789-92; see Baker, supra note 5, at 696, 723.
106. Heflin, supra note 6, at 616 (footnote omitted). In the former Fifth Circuit, the
congressional solution for docket growth was adding judges. This solution itself became the
problem; too many judges made division necessary. See Baker, supra note 5, Part II, section
B.
107. Year-end Report on the Judiciary, by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Dec. 28,
1981).
108. "Ultimately, however, these Circuits [the former Fifth and the present Ninth] must
be divided into three units but we should not wait." Letter from Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger to Representative Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (Sept. 19, 1980), quoted in Ainsworth, supra
note 6, at 525 n.8. For a description of the present Ninth Circuit situation, see Baker, supra
note 5, at 702 n.118. The filings in Texas alone, in the new Fifth Circuit, exceed the Eighth
Circuit and are double those in the First Circuit. Wisdom, supra note 100, at 790. The
problems of precedent in a new two-state circuit comprised of one state from each of the
present Fifth and Eleventh Circuits would stretch the theory of stare decisis in new direc-
tions. q. Baker, supra note 5, at 725 00.283-84.
109. Wisdom, supra note 100, at 788. Judge Wisdom explains:
. If this process were carried to its logical conclusion, the states of Texas, Cali-
fornia and New York would each constitute a circuit. A United States Court
of Appeals does not just settle disputes between litigants. It has a federalizing
function as well as a purely appellate function of reviewing errors. The fed-
eral courts' role is to bring local policy in line with the Constitution and na-
tional policy. Within the framework of "cases and controversies" and subject
to all the appropriate judicial disciplines, federal courts adjust the body politic
to stresses and strains produced by conflicts (1) between the nation and the
states (2) between the government (national, state, and local) and private citi-
zens asserting federally-created or federally-protected rights. The federalizing
role of circuit courts should not be diluted by the creation of a circuit court so
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John Minor Wisdom of the former and new Fifth Circuit, a long time
opponent of splitting, argues that within a year the filings per judge in the
two new courts will be nearly at 1978 crisis levels. lIo He laments, "[t]he
sad fact about the destruction of our great circuit is that it is pointless." 11 I
Judge Wisdom's solution is much more profound: Congress should reduce
federal jurisdiction radically. I 12
Within the larger context of whether circuits should be divided, the
problem of precedent in a divided circuit pales into insignificance. Prece-
dent Times Three sought to prescribe a cure for the split circuits' problems
of stare decisis. This Article has sought to describe how the two new courts
have coped with their schizophrenia. Congress must ultimately decide if
the cure is worse than the disease, whether circuit splitting solves the prob-
lem of one circuit or creates problems for two.
narrowly based that it will be difficult for such a court to overcome the influ-
ence of local prides and prejudices.
Id. (footnote omitted). The use of circuit splitting is limited. "[AIre we to continue the
splitting process until it becomes mincing, with a United States Court of Appeals for the
Houston Metropolitan Area?" Gee, The Imminent lJestruction of the Fifth Circuit; Or, How
Not to lJeal with a Blossoming lJocket, 9 TEX. TECH L. REV. 799, 806 (1978).
110. Wisdom, supra note 100, at 789. Judge Wisdom lists four causes: (1) the addition of
35 new district judges in the two courts who will generate in excess of 40 appeals each per
year; (2) population and industrial growth in the South; (3) congressional legislation increas-
ing rather than decreasing jurisdiction by the creation of new federal rights; and (4) more
appeals resulting from attorneys believing the dockets are clear. Id.; see also Rubin, supra
note 100, at 442-43.
Ill. Wisdom, supra note 105, at 789.
112. Id. at 792 n.7 (citing H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW
(1973».
